The African Development Bank (AfDB) was created on 4 August 1963 in Khartoum, Sudan, where 23 newly independent African countries signed the agreement establishing the institution.[1] On 10 September 1964, the Agreement came into force when 20 member countries subscribed to 65% of the Bank’s capital stock of US$ 250 million. The inaugural meeting of the Board of Governors (mostly Ministers of Finance) was held from 4-7 November 1964 in Lagos, Nigeria. The Bank Headquarters was opened in Abidjan, Cote D’Ivoire, in March 1965, and the Bank commenced operations in July 1966 with ten (10) members of staff. When the Bank was established, only independent African countries were eligible to join.
On 29 November 1972, the Agreement establishing the African Development Fund was signed by the African Development Bank and 13 non-regional countries, referred to as State 3 Participants. The Fund emerged as the solution to two major constraints which became apparent after the Bank had commenced operation: the limited amount of resources which the Bank could provide and the nature as well as terms of the loans to the poorest of its member countries, especially for projects with long-term maturities or non-financial returns such as roads, education and health.
The Nigeria Trust Fund was set up in 1976 by an agreement signed between the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Bank Group. The objective of the Nigeria Trust Fund was to assist the development efforts of low-income West African Regional Member Countries (RMCs) whose economic and social conditions and prospects require concessionary financing. The NTF became operational in April 1976 following approval of the agreement establishing it by the Board of Governors.
Together, these three entities (the African Development Bank, The African Development Fund and the Nigeria Trust Fund) form the African Development Bank (AfDB) Group. Since the African Development Bank’s membership eligibility was restricted to only independent African countries, membership started with only 23 members and increased gradually as more and more African countries gained their independence. For 16 years, the African Development Bank depended on African countries for its capital. However, by this time, it was clear that the capacity of the bank was being constrained by financial limitations among the member states whose ability to fund it were minimal.[2]
On 30th December 1982, a decision was taken to open up the Bank’s capital to non-African participation. Various countries outside the continent of Africa were invited to participate, a decision which proved very positive, in terms of membership and capital structure. As a result of the admission of non-regional members, the AfDB’s capital increased from about US$ 2.9 billion in 1982 to US$ 6.3 billion in 1983, and further to US$ 22. 3 billion, following a 200% Fourth General Capital Increase concluded in Cairo Egypt, in June 1987.
The overall founding objective of the AfDB Group was to provide financing to African countries, individually and collectively,[3] for projects that will effectively contribute to their economic and social development, particularly projects that have the strongest poverty reduction impact on the economies and can improve the living conditions of the population.[4] The Bank Group operates in such a way that its objectives are synchronized with those of the borrowing countries. Projects and programmes submitted for funding by the borrowing member countries must be in conformity with the jointly agreed development policies and strategies of the countries and the institution. The Bank Group assists in mobilizing additional resources through co-financing with bilateral and other multilateral development agencies as well as from the financial markets. It promotes international dialogue and understanding on development issues concerning Africa. It promotes government and private investment in Africa through policy reforms and dialogue, and provides such technical assistance needed in Africa for the selection, study and preparation of development projects.
At the end of December 2012, the Bank had 77 member countries, comprising 53 African or regional member countries (RMCs) and 24 non-African or non-regional member countries (NRMCs). The inclusion of non-regional member countries increased the Bank’s membership, and with a larger membership, the institution was endowed with greater expertise, the credibility of its partners and access to markets in its non-regional member countries. The Bank however maintains its African character by virtue of its geographical location and ownership structure.[5] It is always headquartered in Africa, its investment operations are exclusively in Africa and its President is always an African.
The legal existence of the African Development Bank is enshrined in the Agreement for the Establishment of the African Development Bank, signed in Khartoum on 4th August 1963 and entered into force on 10th September 1964. This Agreement (with its various amendments) forms the legal treaty for the AfDB and is the basis for its legal existence. According to the provisions of this Agreement, a State may, after the Agreement has entered into force, become a member of the Bank by accession to the Agreement on such terms as the Board of Governors may determine; that the Government of such State shall deposit its instrument of accession on or before a date appointed by the Board, and that, upon the deposit, the State concerned shall become a member of the Bank on the appointed date.[6]
The African Development Bank Group and the Republic of South Sudan have had a history of cooperation, which started after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on the 9th January 2005, brokered by the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).[7] Following the independence of the country in July 2011, South Sudan became a member of the African Development Bank in May 2012, and the Bank opened up its country office in Juba in September 2012. In September 2013, its membership was ratified.
The African Development Bank Group commenced lending operations in South Sudan in 2012. Since then, the Bank’s cumulative approvals to South Sudan have amounted to $136.79 million. The sector interventions are agriculture ($45 million), power ($38.9 million), multi-sector ($45.9 million), as well as water and sanitation ($7 million). As of 2023, there are seven active operations in the African Development Bank’s portfolio for South Sudan, with commitments amounting to $108.8 million. The agriculture sector has the largest allocation at 41%, the power sector 35.6%, multi-sector 16.5%, and water supply and sanitation 6.5%.
The Country Strategy Paper (CSP) defines the African Development Bank’s sector areas of intervention, informed by the national development priorities, and has guided the Bank’s development assistance to South Sudan. In July 2018, the South Sudan government adopted its National Development Strategy (NDS) 2018-21, replacing the first National Development Plan 2011-13, extended to 2016. The overarching objective of the new NDS is to consolidate peace and stabilize the economy.[8] In addition, the NDS provides the medium-term framework for implementing Vision 2040, which focuses on justice, liberty and prosperity. The NDS priority areas are: (i) Creating enabling conditions for the return of displaced citizens; (ii) Developing and enforcing the rule of law; (iii) Ensuring secure access to adequate and nutritious food; (iv) Silencing the guns; (v) Restoring and expanding the provision of basic social services; and (vi) Restoring and maintaining basic transport infrastructure, such as roads and bridges.
Following the approval of the NDS 2018-21, in May 2019, the Bank approved the updated Interim Country Strategy Paper (I-CSP) 2012-18, extended to December 2021. The extended I-CSP remains focused on building state capacity and infrastructure development to support the country’s plan to improve the living conditions of its population, and building economic resilience during this transitional period after years of conflict.[9] Greater attention will be directed towards the root causes of fragility by supporting the government to increase transparency in the management of its natural resources to enlarge fiscal space, thereby enabling it to increase investments in productive public sectors like agriculture, for the enhancement of the common good.
In line with the updated I-CSP, during the period 2019-21, the Bank committed itself to invest about $85.4 million in grants to finance investment projects and provide technical assistance. These operations include: (i) improving access to and quality of basic education; (ii) strategic urban and rural water supply and sanitation improvement; (iii) East Africa payment system; (iv) technical assistance and capacity building on oil negotiations; (v) strengthening dialogue for improved economic resilience; (vi) agriculture infrastructure and value addition; (vii) non-oil revenue mobilization and accountability; and (viii) renewable energy.[10]
During the implementation of the updated I-CSP, the following analytical works and strategy formulation will be undertaken to identify lending and co-financing opportunities. These will be on: (i) gender profile; (ii) climate change and green growth profile; (iii) private sector profile; (iv) debt management strategy; (v) feasibility study for the 400 KV South Sudan-Uganda power interconnection project; and (vi) youth empowerment strategy. These studies will also inform the design of future projects and guide the joint government-Bank economic and related policy reforms.
In February 2021, the African Development Bank signed protocols to disburse a $14 million grant to the Government of South Sudan to boost agricultural markets in a project implemented by the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).[11] The Agricultural Markets, Value Addition and Trade Development (AMVAT) project is aimed at enhancing agricultural productivity and boost the marketing and trade of agricultural products in South Sudan. The project is being implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in close liaison with the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security.[12] It is hoped that the five-year project will help increase the productivity and incomes of almost 20,000 farming families in Central and Eastern Equatoria and Jonglei states, most of whom are formerly internally displaced persons who have now returned to their homes.[13]
The project will create aggregation business opportunities for farmers and traders, including women and youth, and provide them with new skills and the agro-processing equipment they need to produce competitive products.[14] Twenty aggregation business centers will serve as ‘one-stop shops’ where farmers can access extension services and connect to markets for their value-added products. Farmer groups joining the aggregation centers will have their products not only tested and quality certified, but also traded with the private sector on their behalf.
The Bank aims to help diversify the South Sudan economy away from oil since its long-term growth is envisioned to depend on promoting agribusiness development. The Bank recognized that South Sudan has considerable unrealized agricultural potential, but the effects of continued violence combined with unprecedented flooding have seriously damaged food production, resulting in a huge food import bill.[15] With this African Development Bank funded project, farmers will move faster from subsistence to commercial agriculture by having access to new technologies, markets and linkages with other services and actors.[16] The Bank observed that despite the country’s agricultural potential and 78 percent of the population employed in agriculture, the sector contributes only one-tenth of the GDP of South Sudan.[17]
In Conclusion, the African Development Bank was established with the primary goal of mobilizing resources to facilitate the development of Africa and its people. Whereas its membership was expanded to include non-African countries (non-regional member countries or NRMCs), it has endeavored to retain the African character and identity. Its legal treaty clearly establishes the legal grounds for its existence and operations. The Bank has established a strong presence in South Sudan even prior to independence and has been involved in various development projects aimed at improving governance and the lives of South Sudan people. The Government and people of South Sudan have and will continue to reap the benefits of their membership of the Bank.
The East African Development Bank was set up to serve member states of the Eat African Community, discuss its legal treaty in the context of South Sudan’s needs.
The East African Development Bank (EADB) is a development finance institution with the objective of promoting development in the member countries of the East African Community.[18]
EADB was established in 1967 under the treaty of the then East African Cooperation between Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. It however collapsed following the breakup of the first East African Community (EAC) in 1977.[19] The bank was re-established under its own charter in 1980. In 2008, following the admission of Burundi and Rwanda into the new EAC, Rwanda applied and was admitted into the EADB.[20] Under the new charter, the bank’s role and mandate were reviewed and its operational scope expanded. Under its expanded operational scope, the bank offers a broad range of financial services in the member states. Its main objective is to strengthen socio-economic development and regional integration.[21]
The Bank’s founding and overriding objective was/is to promote social and economic development of the Member States through: financing of projects in all productive sectors of the Member States’ economies; Supplementing the activities of National Development Agencies of the Member States by joint financing operations, technical assistance and use of such agencies as channels for financing specific projects; Supporting both public and private sector projects that are professionally run, technically feasible and financially viable in all the productive sectors of the Member States’ economies.[22]
And to enhance its regional development objective, EADB places emphasis on: Projects that have regional orientation (Cross-border projects); Projects with a comparative advantage in the utilization of local raw materials in the production of goods for local consumption in the region or for export; and Projects that utilize resources common to the Member States.[23]
The legal mandate of the East Africa Development Bank is enshrined in the East Africa Development Bank Charter of 1980, which replaced the 1967 Treaty of the East African Cooperation, under which the East African Development Bank was originally established. Under the 1967 treaty, the founding members of the Bank were the United Republic of Tanzania, the Republic of Kenya and the Republic of Uganda.[24] In 2008, Rwanda joined the Bank as a Class A member along with Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania,[25] and Burundi also applied to join in 2013.[26] South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the newest member states of the East African Community, have not yet joined the East Africa Development Bank.
Whereas South Sudan is yet to join the East Africa Development Bank, according to its legal treaty, the EADB has a mandate of financing of projects in all productive sectors of the Member States’ economies. Therefore the Bank is obliged to assess the needs of South Sudan as a member state of the Bank’s constituting body (the EAC) and find ways to help. In 2016, the South Sudan economy declined by 13.2% and Burundi declined by 1%.[27] Other members registered modest growth in the same time period, with Uganda growing at 4.6%, Tanzania at 6.6%, Rwanda at 5.9% and Kenya at 6.0%.[28] These growth figures reflect the investment priorities within the region, emphasizing the desire to boost the regional economy and help the poorly performing member states to come to the same level with the other members.
Real GDP growth of South Sudan was an estimated 5.8% in 2019, a large increase from 0.5% in 2018. The 2019 rebound was driven mainly by reopening some oil fields, including those in Upper Nile state, and resuming production, and by the peace agreement signed in September 2018.[29] The oil sector remains the key driver of the economy, followed by services and agriculture. Inflation fell to 24.5% in 2019 from 83.5% in 2018 due to reduced financing of the fiscal deficit. Since its independence in 2011, the country has suffered severe droughts (2011, 2015) and floods (2014, 2017, 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022), resulting in high numbers of casualties, displacements, and loss of livestock, severely impacting people’s livelihoods.
South Sudan remains in a serious humanitarian crisis, with some 9.4 million people, 76% of the population estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance in 2023.[30] Going forward, upholding and fast-tracking the implementation of the peace agreement, strengthening service delivery institutions, governance, and economic and public financial management systems will prove critical as the country seeks to build resilience against future shocks and lay down the building blocks for a diversified, inclusive, and sustainable growth path. The East Africa Development Bank has a crucial role to play in ensuring a reversal of these numerous challenges.
In conclusion, South Sudan as a new nation on the continent and a new member of the East African Community is understandably under-resourced with regards to the socio-political and economic infrastructures. Any shocks experienced in the country are bound to have ripple effects in the neighboring countries and the entire region. Much as South Sudan has not yet subscribed to the East Africa Development Bank, it’s still in the mandate of the Bank to render assistance to the country as a member of the East African Community. As stated in its mission statement; ‘To promote sustainable socio-economic development in East Africa by providing development finance, support and advisory services,’ its an obligation of the Bank to devise ways and means of effectively and adequately meeting the current and future needs of the young nation.
Discuss the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) imposed by the IMF and the World Bank in the 1980s and 1990s in the context of international debts and underdevelopment in many African countries. How would you advise the World Bank and IMF with respect to the debt burden on these countries?
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) are economic policies that have been promoted by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) for developing countries since the early 1980s as prerequisites for the provision of development loans.[31] The loans are conditional on the adoption of such policies. They are designed to encourage the structural adjustment of an economy by, for example, removing ‘excess’ government controls and promoting market competition as part of the World Bank’s neo-liberal agenda.[32] The Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility is an IMF financing mechanism to support of macroeconomic policies and Structural Adjustment Programs in low-income countries through loans or low interest subsidies. Structural adjustments are commonly thought of as free market reforms, and they are made conditional on the assumption that they will make the nation in question more competitive and encourage economic growth.[33]
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, two Bretton Woods institutions that date from the 1940s, have long imposed conditions on their loans. However, the 1980s saw a concerted push to turn lending to crisis-stricken poor countries into springboards for reform. Structural adjustment programs have demanded that borrowing countries introduce broadly free-market systems coupled with fiscal restraint, or occasionally outright austerity.[34] Countries have been required to perform some combination of the following: devaluing their currencies to reduce balance of payments deficits, cutting public sector employment, subsidies, and other spending to reduce budget deficits, privatizing state-owned enterprises and deregulating state-controlled industries, easing regulations in order to attract investment by foreign businesses, and closing tax loopholes and improving tax collection domestically.[35]
To assist African development, Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) provided ‘conditional lending’,[36] conditional in that governments receiving debt relief were obliged to adjust their economic policy. In general, ‘adjustment’ meant liberalizing and privatizing, although SAPs were wider in scope in that their developmental aims were highly political. Academic literature generally agrees upon the ineffectiveness of SAPs since Africa is still ‘relatively poor’ and the economic crisis it faces is ‘acute, all-encompassing, and worsening’.[37] The notion of SAPs being effective and necessary for achieving African development would likely be favored by the Bretton Woods institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) who are its creators.
Effective development implies a transition or shift, as does ‘adjustment’; in this context, the balance of international lending moving from public to private sectors,[38] the latter deemed the more ‘developed’ stage made conditional to the loaning process. Where this transition occurred successfully, the effectiveness of SAPs would be clear, that prior to the shift, most states were suffocating from their debt burden,[39] and were consequently saved from complete economic ruin as a result of adjustment.[40] For example, in Angola, the annual average rate of oil exports increased by eight percent, with the IMF claiming this was due to SAPs having liberalized economic policy by increasing the transparency of their exports and related operations.
After this increase, Angola had supposedly gained comparative advantage over other Southern African states now open for competition within a free trade area. Much the same for Zambia’s copper-dominant exports, its mining sector was previously suppressed by parastatal sectors and inefficient governmental policy but had been appeased through adjustment. SAPs in both states had assisted development from highly regulated trade regimes to ones with financial and fiscal order,[41] where there could be enduring economic diversification and progress.
The IMF noted strong economic growth in Angola and that it had succeeded in reducing inflation, to at least some extent indicative of effectiveness, where there had been state-regulation over the previous three decades, there had been a depreciated exchange rate. In other words, before the economic ‘shift’, state-practice resulted in significant inefficiencies and welfare losses. Now, after having ‘freed the market’, SAPs ensured African states could escape from their protectionist policies and that they were no longer trapped by debts ‘far beyond their capacity to finance.’[42] It is from this liberating notion, and with the consequent positive economic indicators, that the effectiveness of SAPs can be stated.
The effectiveness of the SAPs is however, portrayed as being dependent on and largely inseparable from the necessity of adjustment. The necessity of development is closely linked to idea that it was inevitable, that the transition was natural and progressive, and that a lack of change was unsustainable.[43] This would imply that there was little to no pressure or external leverage[44] and that SAPs assisted rather than coerced African states to attain a development that retains the legitimacy it conceptually requires. Zambia, for example, according to the World Bank, was ‘crying out for reform’.[45] According to the IMF, African states were manipulating internal pricing and currency valuation, import and export efficiency was being constrained, which limited their growth potential.[46] As a consequence of debt, poverty, income inequality and illiteracy were synonymous to many Africa states like Angola. In other words, according Adebayo Adedeji, executive secretary for the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, ‘Africa had to adjust and reform had to happen’.[47]
The strategy behind SAPs backfired, leaving Africa crippled by debts.[48] SAPs lead to overall economic failure and had destructive social consequences. The SAPs exacerbated government debts,[49] and their “damaging” cumulative effect. Although evasive of blame, even the IMF itself conceded that economic potential in Angola had been crippled. The repayment of accumulated Zambian debt had to be rescheduled four times, due to skyrocketing prices for essential goods, and shrinking levels of employment and income as a result of privatization.[50]
However, claims that SAPs were never effective, because the obligation of governments to service debt payments makes it impossible for structural adjustment policies to succeed.[51] African states would never be able to pay-off their debts, and the subsequent irony of SAPs being constantly necessary and constantly unobtainable, leaves open the criticism that SAPs are necessary only when adhering to a utopian ideal of necessitating liberalization. In the African context, SAPs were largely unsuitable and were essentially not adapted to the African situation.[52] While this may be the case, and while there were internal factors complicating implementation, such as educational, political, social deficiencies, IFIs claimed these domestic complications could be overcome through adjustment.
One fear was that African states would lose sovereignty being more dependent on IFIs for aid and would thus receive a subordinate position in the world economy.[53] However, according to the IMF and World Bank, this could be avoided with the principle of ‘adjustment with transformation’. They claimed that SAPs provided assistance only with consent: regarding the conditional element of debt-relief, African states could dictate their own conditions.[54] As the argument goes, SAPs would be made relevant through transforming the conditions to suit African states, after which IFIs would not shoulder blame if the ‘assistance’ was ineffective, but at the same time, take credit for successful assistance, or positive feedback from it.
SAPs were a hindrance rather than a form of assistance due to the “global capitalist” economies behind the loaning process. These economies exploited and directed African states from the outside: they provided loans but dictated the conditions for repaying them.[55] The idea that the implementation of SAPs was ‘inevitable’ was only used to perpetrate the idea that rejecting them was not an acceptable option.[56] African states had to implement reform, not for their beneficial necessity but rather due to the ‘IMF-decreed’ and inescapable condition of adjustment.[57] It is evident that national sovereignty had been made subordinate to ‘international sovereignty’.
Once the Bretton Woods institutions had ‘control of exports’,[58] the prices they paid for them decreased, while the cost of their own exports into Africa increased. This was neo-colonialism through ‘coerced adoption’.[59] Profits were exported to the West and economic growth was crippled through limited local investment. Investment had to be directed towards mono-crop industries, a continuation of the colonial legacy, forcing African states to seek demand from within the international free trade arena until they had become totally dependent on IFIs – the very actors claiming to be reducing Africa’s dependency. The SAPs in other words only intensified the perpetration of debt and underdevelopment in Africa.
The IMF and World Bank has over the past 40 years been pushing for structural adjustments as vehicles for reform and development in Africa and other poor regions of the world, with very little evidence over the years to justify it. Instead, wherever these structural adjustments have been adopted, evidence shows mostly negative effects on the local economies, as most of the benefits of the structural adjustment have gone to Western companies and businesses. Whereas the narrative from the IFIs has been to blame the borrowing countries for the failures, it’s undeniable that the concept of SAPs was ill-intentioned and mainly aimed at benefiting the West. Since the poor countries of the world still need development aid to help their development policies and projects, there is need for the IMF and World Bank to make changes to their policy conditions in order to leave some room for poor countries to maneuver.
Since the concept of SAPs was conceived by the IMF and World Bank has been detrimental to the development of third world nations, and instead acted as a vehicle for further neo-colonial exploitation which have trapped Africa in debt, these IFIs must admit to their mistakes and take steps to rectify them. First would be total debt cancellation for all African nations that have been hugely indebted over the past 40 years of SAPs. This would create some goodwill by demonstrating a gesture of admission of misguided policies of structural adjustment, and also stop the further crippling of African economies.
The IMF and World Bank would also be advised to work together with the hugely indebted African countries and other international financial institutions such as the World Trade Organization to enable access to global markets for African goods. That way, Africa will be able to balance its trade and reduce on their level of dependence on the West for financing. One of the most crippling aspect of the Africa-EuroAmerican relationship has been the hypocrisy of the Euro-Americans demanding that Africa opens up its markets for their manufactured goods, but at the same time, they don’t allow access for African goods to their markets.
The IMF and World Bank should also promote genuine technology and capital transfer to African economies in order to provide the very crucial capital and technical capacity required to advance African economies. Over the decades, Africa has remained the ground for Euro-American dumping and majority of the investment ventures from the west are more of money-laundering schemes than capital transfers.
In conclusion, the SAPs have operated with impunity since their introduction in the 1980s, with very far-reaching consequences on African economies. But since they have always delivered on the interests of the IFIs which initiated them, they have continued to be enforced, to a further entrapment of African economies into debt. Since its now widely accepted, even among the IMF and World Bank themselves that the SAPs have largely failed, there is therefore need for a complete change of strategy, to stop the neo-colonialist exploitation and allow Africa a genuine chance to take charge of their own development.
References
Agreement for the Establishment of the African Development Bank.
AfDB (2023). South Sudan and the AfDB. African Development Bank Group, External Relations and Communication Unit, Tunis-Belvedere, Tunisia.
AfDB (2021b). Republic of South Sudan: Interim Country Strategy Paper (I-CSP) 2022- 2024, East Africa Regional Development and Business Delivery Office and Country Economics Department.
AfDB (2021a). African Development Bank, FAO and South Sudan’s government ink protocols for $14 million grant to boost agricultural markets. African Development Bank Group, External Relations and Communication Unit, Tunis-Belvedere, Tunisia.
AfDB (2013). African Development Bank: In Brief. AfDB External Relations and Communication Unit, Tunis-Belvedere, Tunisia.
AfDB (2012). Evaluation of the Assistance of the African Development Bank to Fragile States. Operations Evaluation Department, African Development Bank Group, Tunis.
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EADB (2016). East African Development Bank Annual Report and Accounts – 2016
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Mshomba, R. (2017). The Rise and Fall of the Former East African Community. In Economic Integration in Africa: The East African Community in Comparative Perspective (pp. 49-73). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ocampo, J.A. (Ed) (2006). Regional Financial Cooperation. Brookings Institute, Washington D.C
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Thomson, A. (2010). An Introduction to African Politics, 3rd Edition. New York: Taylor & Francis.
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[1] AfDB (2013). African Development Bank: In Brief. AfDB External Relations and Communication Unit, Tunis-Belvedere, Tunisia.
[2] Humphrey, C. (2014). The African Development Bank: Ready to face the challenges of a changing Africa? Expertgruppen för Biståndsanalys (EBA), Stockholm.
[3] Article 1, Agreement for the Establishment of the African Development Bank.
[4] Article 2(1a), Agreement for the Establishment of the African Development Bank.
[5] Article 3, Agreement for the Establishment of the African Development Bank.
[6] Article 64(2), Agreement for the Establishment of the African Development Bank.
[7] AfDB (2012). Evaluation of the Assistance of the African Development Bank to Fragile States. Operations Evaluation Department, African Development Bank Group, Tunis.
[8] AfDB (2021b). Republic of South Sudan: Interim Country Strategy Paper (I-CSP) 2022- 2024, East Africa Regional Development and Business Delivery Office and Country Economics Department.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid
[11] AfDB (2021a). African Development Bank, FAO and South Sudan’s government ink protocols for $14 million grant to boost agricultural markets. African Development Bank Group, External Relations and Communication Unit, Tunis-Belvedere, Tunisia.
[12] Ibid
[13] FAO/WB (2022). Transforming agriculture in South Sudan from humanitarian aid to a development oriented growth path, Food and Agriculture Organization and World Bank.
[14] Ibid.
[15] MAFC&RD (2012). Agriculture Sector Policy Framework (ASPF): 2012 – 2017. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Cooperatives and Rural Development, Juba.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Moody’s Investors Service (4 August 2017). ‘Moody’s Affirms East African Development Bank’s Baa3 Long-Term Issuer Rating; Outlook Stable’. London: Moody’s Investors Service. Retrieved 27 June 2019.
[19] Trouille, J.M.; Trouille, H.; & Uwimbabazi, P. (2012). The East African Community Intraregional Integration and Relations with the EU, London, Rutledge.
[20] Juuko, Sylvia (25 February 2008). “Rwanda Joins EADB”. New Vision. Retrieved 25 June 2014.
[21] Mshomba, R. (2017). The Rise and Fall of the Former East African Community. In Economic Integration in Africa: The East African Community in Comparative Perspective (pp. 49-73). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[22] Trouille, J.M.; Trouille, H.; & Uwimbabazi, P. (2012). The East African Community Intraregional Integration and Relations with the EU, London, Rutledge.
[23] Ocampo, J.A. (Ed) (2006). Regional Financial Cooperation. Brookings Institute, Washington D.C
[24] Article 21 of the Treaty of the East African Cooperation – 1967
[25] Article 3(1) of the Treaty of the East African Cooperation – 1967
[26] Ertner, R. (June 4th 2013). Burundi to join the East Africa Development Bank?, Available at: https://www.into-sa.com/enews/burundi-to-join-east-african-development-bank/
[27] EADB (2016). East African Development Bank Annual Report and Accounts – 2016
[28] Ibid
[29] EADB (2022). Economic environment outlook, 2022. East Africa Development Bank, Arusha.
[30] World Bank. (2023). The World Bank in South Sudan, Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan/overview#:~:text=Since%20its%20independence%20in%202011,in%20a%20serious%20humanitarian%20crisis.
[31] UN-ESCWA (2020). Structural Adjustment Programs. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. Available at: https://archive.unescwa.org/structural-adjustment-programmes#:~:text=Structural%20Adjustment%20Programmes%20(SAPs)%20are,the%20adoption%20of%20such%20policies.
[32] Oringa, J. & Welch, C. (1998). Structural Adjustment Programs, Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF). Institute for Policy Studies.
[33] UN-ESCWA (2020). Structural Adjustment Programs. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. Available at: https://archive.unescwa.org/structural-adjustment-programmes#:~:text=Structural%20Adjustment%20Programmes%20(SAPs)%20are,the%20adoption%20of%20such%20policies.
[34] Thomson, A. (2010). An Introduction to African Politics, 3rd Edition. New York: Taylor & Francis.
[35] Tsikata, D. (1995) Effects of Structural Adjustment on Women and the Poor. Third World Resurgence, 61, 1-8. https://www.twn.my/title/adjus-cn.htm
[36] Thomson, A. (2010). An Introduction to African Politics, 3rd Edition. New York: Taylor & Francis.
[37] Fatton, R. (1992). Predatory Rule: State and Civil Society in Africa, London: Lynne Rienner.
[38] Williams, G. (2007). Why Structural Adjustment Is Necessary And Why It Doesn’t Work. Review of African Political Economy, 21 (60), pp.214-225.
[39] Thomson, A. (2010). An Introduction to African Politics, 3rd Edition. New York: Taylor & Francis.
[40] Chabal, P. & Daloz, J. (1999). Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[41] Chabal, P. & Daloz, J. (1999). Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[42] Williams, G. (2007). Why Structural Adjustment Is Necessary And Why It Doesn’t Work. Review of African Political Economy, 21 (60), pp.214-225.
[43] Clapham, C. (1996). Africa and fhe International System: The Politics of State Survival. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[44] Marais, H. (2000). South Africa Pushed To The Limit. London: Zed Books.
[45] Clapham, C. (1996). Africa and fhe International System: The Politics of State Survival. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[46] Chabal, P. & Daloz, J. (1999). Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[47] Fatton, R. (1992). Predatory Rule: State and Civil Society in Africa, London: Lynne Rienner.
[48] Thomson, A. (2010). An Introduction to African Politics, 3rd Edition. New York: Taylor & Francis.
[49] Williams, G. (2007). Why Structural Adjustment Is Necessary And Why It Doesn’t Work. Review of African Political Economy, 21 (60), pp.214-225.
[50] Fatton, R. (1992). Predatory Rule: State and Civil Society in Africa, London: Lynne Rienner.
[51] Williams, G. (2007). Why Structural Adjustment Is Necessary And Why It Doesn’t Work. Review of African Political Economy, 21 (60), pp.214-225.
[52] Ferguson, J. (2006). Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order. London: Duke University Press.
[53] Fatton, R. (1992). Predatory Rule: State and Civil Society in Africa, London: Lynne Rienner.
[54] Clapham, C. (1996). Africa and fhe International System: The Politics of State Survival. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[55] Fatton, R. (1992). Predatory Rule: State and Civil Society in Africa, London: Lynne Rienner.
[56] Clapham, C. (1996). Africa and fhe International System: The Politics of State Survival. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[57] Marais, H. (2000). South Africa Pushed To The Limit. London: Zed Books.
[58] Thomson, A. (2010). An Introduction to African Politics, 3rd Edition. New York: Taylor & Francis.
[59] Ferguson, J. (2006). Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order. London: Duke University Press.