Federalism in General
Federalism can conventionally be regarded as a decentralized way of managing policy (Elazar, 1985, p. 15). It can be described as a union of various distinct states where political and economic power is shared between the central government and lower regional or state authorities. The common aspect of federalism is shared power and self-determination, in which two or more tiers of government are assumed, that is; the federal (central or uniin) government and the state (regional or provincial) governments. The concept of shared rule and self-determination in federalism is premised on the idea that it presents advantages in as far as solving the challenges of liberty and governance.
Federalism, according to Kincaid (1995, p. 2), aspires to ‘maximize the democratic and economic advantages of both small and large republics by minimizing the anarchistic temptations of small republics to fight each other and the monopolistic temptations of large republics to become tyrannical.’ It is therefore true that federalism galvanizes democracy by enabling collective participation in governance at the very least, at two tiers. It also protects the interests of small ethno-national peoples in big republics by protecting them from being dwindled into extinction and also minimizing the hegemonic imperialism of large nationalities upon small ones within a state.
There is no denying the fact that federalism is best positioned to provide the possibility of having a pluralistic system with deeper political and legal liberties among diverse peoples and ethnic nationalities. It however must be pointed out that much as federalism is presented as the most viable system for accommodating ethno-national differences and address the desire for regional/local autonomy, it is not necessarily meant for large states alone, since small states also have the same problems, the localized desires and agitations for to have political power diffused across the nation in order to prevent the tyranny of the central authority (Anderson, 2008, p. 5).
Types or variations of federalism
The word federalism was coined from the Latin word ‘foedus’, which means ‘convenant’ ((Kincaid, 1995, p. 5). Federalism therefore is basically a good-faith treaty or covenant agreement among various small states to come together and form a larger central authority. This idea of a good-faith covenant can be applied in various different forms, which can all be categorized as having ‘federal’ features, according to Elazar (1985, p. 159-160). The four major variations of federalism as identified by Elazar include:
Federation, which establishes a central authority, forming a government at the top and various subordinate local units which are self-governing but subscribe to a single common constitutional order. In this form of federalism, people in local units voluntarily relegate their authority to the central government in such spheres of their lives where common governmental authority is beneficial to them all (Elazar, 1985, p. 161). Examples of such federations include the Canada, Switzerland and USA, where power is relegated from the states upwards to the federal government, rather than being devolved from the federal government downwards to states and provinces.
Confederation, which is where the lower units come together to form a central governance system, but at the same time they retain their sovereign power (Elazar, 1985, p. 161). In this type of federalism, lower units maintain control over governmental authority and act as a go-between for the central government and the citizenry. Also in this type of federal arrangement, the lower units have a pre-determined right to secede if they so wish since they are allowed to unilaterally declare a withdrawal from the central government. This is possible because in the confederation arrangement, lower state units maintain their sovereign authority even when they confederate with others to form a federal state (Friedrich, 1968). It is however, pertinent to point out that the provision for at-will secession means that constituent units do not have total commitment towards ensuring a well-functioning and lasting unitary government because they can withdraw any time they wish, which is the fundamental purpose of federalism arrangements.
Federacy, which is an arrangement where constituent units/lower states do not have uniform power or autonomy within the federal system. In this type of federal arrangement, lower state units command control and autonomy depending on their status within the federal establishment, where some units have more autonomous power compared to others in the same federal arrangement. It can be seen as an experimental transition to a more permanent federal union (Elazar, 1985, p. 162). Examples of federacy in the world today include the arrangement between England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales which forms the United Kingdom. Also, the arrangement where Basque, Catalonia and Galicia provinces have been granted greater autonomy and political freedoms compared the rest of the constituent units within the Kingdom of Spain. However, it must be noted that when a federacy arrangement does not lead to a more permanent union, it might instead result into loss of autonomy of the federated unit, for example, whereas the states of Pueto Rico and Guam are in a federacy arrangement with the USA, they are not included among the 50 states that constitute the USA, yet they are not independent either.
Associated statehood, which is also asymmetrical system where federated units/states are no more bound to the federate union than it meets their interests. The agreements to form an associated statehood provides for certain conditions where the federated unit can break ties with the federate union (Elazar, 1985, p. 160). An associated statehood arrangement can therefore be described as a lose federacy.
Federalism as a mode of state formation
There are three basics ways through which nation states come into being; through forceful conquest, through organic/accidental evolution and through an agreement or covenant. A federalism arrangement is the later, a consensual agreement between various units to come together. Federalism differs from a state formed out of coercion/force or conquest, where an authoritarian hierarchical power pyramid forms with the conquerors at the top, the middlemen in the middle and the masses at the bottom (Friedrich, 1968). It also differs from the organic evolution where political life develops organically from social organizational structures from families, to tribes, to villages to larger political arrangements, with the desire to meet common challenges, from which institutional, power and constitutional arrangements arise from the regular social interactions (Elazar, 1987, p. 18).
Since federalism is a product of a choice-based arrangement, it therefore is at odds with the forceful conquest as a foundation for state formation, and it also differs from organic evolution (Kesler & Rossiter, 1999, p. 1). This makes federalism the most ideal form of state formation which can bring together various different units to form a union government that works for and meets the needs and interests of all. In federalism arrangements, decisions result from elaborate negotiations, and it’s this element of negotiated decision making that attracts even the most naturally diverse societies from their cultural, ethnic or religious units. Federalism allows societies whose divisions emanate from ethnic, religious, cultural or ideological grounds to subject themselves to non-territorial unions, whose leaderships are collectively chosen from the leaderships of all the constituent groups (Elazar, 1987, p. 20).
What makes federalism convenient as a conflict regulating device is the fact that it is not only based on territorial boundaries, but also perpetuates the historical identities of diverse peoples. It is therefore pertinent to argue that pluralism, which is the constituent part of federalism, provides a safeguard for the liberties of all peoples, thereby ensuring that liberties and choice remain the cornerstone of federalism as a pluralistic arrangement.
It should however, be noted that in upholding pluralism as its fundamental facet, federalism makes it hard to attain a total integration because it maintains and agitates for the preservation of identities and interests of individual units as opposed to the collective union, keeping them together and yet separate from each other. Federalism can only work if it manages to bring together ethnic kinship and democratic consent into an arrangement that can maintain political viability and ensure constitutional protections for both territorial and non-territorial units. As such, federalism not only maintains individual pluralism of the constituent units, but also contains it, because as Elazar points out; “the virtue of federalism not only lies in its ability to maintain pluralism, but also in containing it at the same time” (Elazar, 1991, p. 31).
Federalism is most successful in societies where; there are vibrant civil awareness which limits government excesses; a severed sovereignty which allows power sharing between federal and local governments but at the same time leaves room for constructive inter-governmental engagement; there is a uniform federal arrangement with the same rights, benefits and powers with no special empowerment or restrictions on one/some constituent unit(s) compared to others; there is a social culture that is supportive to federalism politics; efforts are taken to negotiate, compromise and re-negotiate where necessary, to reach broad-based consensus; there is a clear-cut balance between competition and cooperation in inter-governmental engagements, where cooperation enables federalism duality, but also leaves enough room for state units to determine their political future and even reject federal policies where they don’t meet their interests; and a clear separation of powers among federal institutions.
Nevertheless, federalism, with its ability to bring together divided peoples with their various diversities, is not without opposition or criticism. Opposition to federalism comes from two forces, centralisationalists and fragmentationalists. To centralization forces, opposition to federalism is often geared towards totalitarianism and consolidated domination, while fragmentation opposition comes from ethno-nationalistic forces geared towards total secession. Among the two, the fragmentation forces of ethnic nationalists pose the strongest threat to federalism (Duchacek, 1987). This is because the uncompromising nature of ethnic nationalism tends to more or less hold any government to ransom, in sharp contrast to federalism which enabled by negotiations and agreement/covenanting (Eschet-Schwartz, 1991). Because federalism is a middle-ground democratic endeavor which is only enabled through consent and compromise, social attitudes like ethno-nationalistic beliefs which postulate uncompromising behavior are direct threats that make federalism not only hard to achieve but also impossible in some instances (Watts, 1998).
Case study: Ethiopia
Ethiopia has been described as a ‘museum of people’ (Levine, 1974, p. 19), because of its numerous diversities with interests transcending ethno-cultural, economic and religious ways of people’s lives. Because of the ethno-national diversity, ethnicity has taken on a multi-dimensional significance in the public sphere (Zewde, 2008, p. 20). The ethnic construct of the country is therefore given serious consideration in an effort to restructure the nation state of Ethiopia as a multi-cultural and multi-national country. The preamble to the Federal constitution of 1995 recognize this plurality of ethnicity by stating that ‘We, the Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia’ (Proclamation No. 1/1995).
The ethnic realities in the country are as a result of the unbalanced and often conflicting pre-historic relations among the various ethnic groups. Federalism was preferred as a response to the challenges of ethno-national struggles that characterized the ancient Ethiopian state, in order to build an ethnic-sensitive nation bringing together ethnic identities under one flag. Yet, according to Watts (2008) and Anderson (2008), experiences from the past three decades of the experiment of federalism do not point to a perfectly binding solution to ethnic conflicts, rather, in some circles it’s even viewed as contributing to new emergent conflicts as well as perpetrating and magnifying old ones.
Ethiopia can be accurately described as a conflict-riddled nation, with class and status conflicts dominating its 20th century political landscape, and according to Keller (1995, p. 623), economic/ethno-national conflicts are recognized as the most important political conflicts in the country’s history. Class conflicts (arising out of economic disparities) were the precursor of the 1974 revolution that toppled Emperor Haile Selassie. The successive regimes have since recognized and prioritized the management, resolution and transformation of ethnic conflicts as necessary for political sustainability, and the quest for ethnic equality, self-determination and ethno-cultural justice has taken center stage on the political agenda.
Protracted negotiations among the various key ethno-nationalist political groups were centered on trying to reach an agreement which culminated into the 1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, with guarantees of autonomy (article 39(3)), religious, linguistic and cultural freedoms (article 39(2)), as well as participation in political decision-making, and political representation (article 38). Federalism was envisioned as the only legitimate, appropriate and effective remedy to the ethno-national conflicts that dominated Ethiopian history.
It was used to address some demands of some ethnic nationalities, as well as subjugate other sub-national agitations, for example, through the Constitutional guarantees of autonomy and sub-national/regional representation, agitations for secession (self-determination) among the Somali and Oromo communities were successfully subdued, albeit temporarily. Given the choice of either a violent struggle for secession or asserting their autonomy and equality in one Ethiopia, the Oromo Liberation Front chose to take up their autonomy, keeping the country together at the very least, to this day (Tadesse, 2006, p. 6). Federalism succeeded in devolving identity conflicts and grievances to regional/sub-national level, where they are adequately addressed with local experiences and expertise.
The federalism concept in Ethiopia had two major tasks; one was providing appropriate answers to old questions, transforming old conflicts and meeting old demands; and second was to manage new conflicts, address emerging challenges as well as initiate and effectively manage investments projects that could ensure conflict transformation. Federalism in Ethiopia brought unity, peace and some guarantee of ethno-cultural justice, albeit all partially. It also attempted a temporary truce and tried to ensure that there was equality among the various nationalities and peoples. But by trying to find solutions for existing challenges, it ended up birthing new challenges and conflicts in the scramble for control of the newly created power, resources and opportunities (Regassa, 2009). For example, with federalism came a heightened sense of self-awareness along with new demands for self-governance, identity and autonomy, economic justice as well as political empowerment; in other words, a new demand for statehood and territorial autonomy, which in turn resulted into territorial disputes.
Federalism as a conflict regulating tool
Federalism presents a realistic capacity to serve as a conflict regulating tool both in conflicting and post-conflict areas. Given the fact that it’s mode of formation is through negotiation and covenanting and it’s centrally based on consensual agreements, makes its viability unlike any other form of state formation, as a conflict regulating mechanism. In areas where governmental authority is formulated out of tensions and violent confrontations arising from the agitation for recognizing diverse identities, accommodating ethnic differences, enabling representative participation as well as political and economic autonomy, federalism presents the best solution out of such a complicated scenario.
Where conflicts arise from grievances related to the desire for protection of minority identities, federalism offers the best guarantee for such protection and also entices warring parties to come together to negotiate by its very nature of negotiated agreements. And where conflicts result from the desire for preservation of national unity amidst local nationalistic fragmentations, the flexibility provided by federalism diversity still offers a bearable solution to national and sub-national agitations. Federalism is the middle ground in scenarios where national patriotism is challenged by threats of disintegration, and where ethno-national identity is threatened by imperialistic domination.
In either scenario, federalism offers realistic incentives for conflict regulation. However, the only way that federalism can be a viable tool for conflict regulation is when all parties involved show genuine willingness to make compromises in order to reach ends that are unreachable through military/violent means. The viability of federalism can only be realized when all conflicting groups come to a stalemate and cannot see themselves achieving their objectives through conflict. Furthermore, federalism provides a guarantee of sub-national self-determination, promises fair representation and shared decision making in central government, averts the danger of domination through centralized government, and at the same time maintains the bigger federal state together, all of which entice warring parties to put their differences aside and seek peaceful resolution to their conflicts.
In areas where post-conflict wounds and suspicions are still fresh, where tensions and divisions still linger between unitary and separatist forces, federalism can provide a compromise solution for conflict regulation. The covenanting aspect of federalism helps lay ground for a meaningful relationship between warring parties through good-faith negotiations. And with these negotiations, a democratic and constitutional avenue is created where old rivalries can be expressed other than the militaristic/violent means. Federalism replaces military objectives with legal, political democratic and electoral battles which in turn reaffirm conflict regulation.
Through federalism, opposing interests whose pursuit may threaten the very existence of the state, are instead transformed and their pursuit may instead bring the nation together and push it into a new trajectory. Previously oppressed voices which would only be expressed through conflict, are provided with a new and peaceful platform to be heard, debated and collective consensus reached. Federalism does not silence national or sub-national agitations, on the contrary, it amplifies them but also gives them a legitimate, non-violent field in which they can be played out.
In conclusion, federalism and conflicts seem to be grounded in an interlocking relationship, where ethno-national conflicts necessitate federalism. The type of federalism adopted is determined by the nature of the conflict necessitating it, and the adopted federalism type in turn may trigger new types of conflicts which arise out of its practicality or lack thereof. The adopted type of federalism arrangement also speaks to the conflict regulation mechanisms sought after. As such federalism is observed to regulate some existing conflicts, but may also result into the development of new conflicts or even transform existing ones. The Ethiopian federalism was adopted in response old historical conflicts, some of which it managed to regulate albeit temporarily, such as the Oromo liberation movement and the Somali independence movement, but it also created new ones, for example the current rebellion by the Tigrey People’s Liberation Front secession of Tigrey region. Nevertheless, in societies where there are contestations over ethnic-identity, political representation, resource allocation, and autonomy, federalism offers a solution that is capable of addressing these and more grievances and also prevent the total disintegration of the nation in general.
References
- Anderson, G. (2008). Federalism: An Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Duchacek, I. (1987). Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Elazar, D. (ed) (1991), Federal systems of the World: A Hand book of Federal, Confederal, and Autonomy Arrangements. London: Longman Group.
- Elazar, D. (1987), Exploring Federalism. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.
- Elazar, D. (1985). “The Role of Federalism in Political Integration.” In Federalism and Political Integration (Daniel Elazar, ed). (Lanham, MD: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs/ University Press of America), pp. 13-16.
- Eschet-Shwartz, A. (1991). ‘Can the Swiss Federal Experience Serve as a Model of Federal Integration,’ in Daniel Elazar, (ed) Constitutional Design and Power sharing in the Post-Modern Epoch. Lanham, MD: Univ. Press of America;
- Friedrich, J.C. (1968). Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice. New York: Praeger.
- Keller, E.J. (1995). The ethno-genesis of the Oromo Nation and its implications for politics in Ethiopia, Journal of Modern African Studies, 33(4), p. 623
- Kesler, R.C. & Rossiter, C. (eds) (1999). The Federalist Papers, New York: Mentor.
- Kincaid, J. (1995). ‘Foreword’ Federalism: What is it? Where Might it take us?, (Law Related Education), Vol 19, No.3. (Chicago: American Bar Association), p.1-8.
- Levine, D.N. (1974). Greater Ethiopia: the Evolution of a Multi-ethnic Society. (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press), p. 19-20.
- Regassa, T. (ed) (2009). Issues of Federalism in Ethiopia: Towards an Inventory. Constitutional Law Series, No.2, Addis Ababa: AAU Press.
- Tadesse, M. (2006), The Quest for Conflict Settlement in Ethiopia’s Periphery. Addis Ababa: Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung (FES), p. 6.
- Watts, R. (2008). Comparing Federal Systems (2nd ed). Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
- Zewde, B. (2008). Society, State and History: Selected Essays. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press, p. 20.