A conference was held in Juba, the capital of Equatoria Province, Southern Sudan, in June 1947, hosted by the British Civil Secretary. This conference marked the high point of the British colonial policy known as the Southern Policy, which guided British action in Southern Sudan during the period of 1930-1946. To grasp the full significance of the issues involved at the conference, this paper examines the historical roots of the division between North and South Sudan; the development of British policy in the South during the interwar period and its abandonment after World War II; and the Juba Conference itself. The North-South conflict can be characterized as a clash of cultures resulting from the interaction between a southward-moving Islamic cultural frontier and indigenous African cultures in the South.
As early as 1902, conscious of these cultural differences, the British had begun to treat the North and the South as distinct entities with different stages of development and progress. This policy was legalized in 1930 by the announcement of Southern Policy. In 1946, without consulting Southern opinion, the British administration reversed its Southern Policy and began instead to implement a policy on uniting the North and the South. This caused anger and resentment in the south, and as a gesture of goodwill to the southerners, a conference was convened in Juba in 1947 to discuss the issues of unity. Much as the conference was convened as ‘a gesture’ to southerners, the hidden aim being the appeasement of Northern Sudanese nationalists and the Egyptian government.
The Juba Conference was a meeting convened in June 1947, which was attended by British and Sudanese delegates in the city of Juba, the then regional capital of Equatoria Province in South Sudan (today the national capital of the Republic of South Sudan). The British organized the conference in a bid to combine northern and southern Sudan into one political entity before independence. Until then, the two sectors were essentially treated by the British as two separate colonies because of ethnic, religious and cultural differences. Northern Sudan, which was greatly favored by the British, was heavily ‘Arabized’ and had a fairly well-structured political and economic infrastructure. Northerners practiced Islam and were relatively well-educated. Southern Sudan was mainly composed of various Nilotic tribes who practiced a mixture of Christian and traditional beliefs. It was largely neglected by the colonial administration in terms of development and economically, it did not possess the organization of northern Sudan.
The Juba Conference reached consensus that northern and southern Sudan would constitute one state and that a Legislative Assembly would represent the entire colony. However, the southern Sudanese representatives had several reservations about the resolutions, largely due to the fact that since their region was neglected over the colonial period, they were in an inferior position in regards to their region’s lack of educational and political experience. Their apprehension was proved when 800 administrative posts were vacated by the British in preparation for Sudanese ‘self-rule’, only 4 of the government administrative posts went to Southerners. Also, in discussions to determine the future of the modern state of Sudan, the southern provinces were largely excluded from the political process.
The Juba Conference of 1947 was the first time that the collective opinion of southern Sudanese was canvassed concerning a national political issue. Since 1930, British administrative policy in the Sudan had kept open the possibility that the southern provinces might one day be transferred to the colonial authority of British East Africa. This remained only a theoretical option since it could not be done as long as Sudan remained an Egyptian colony in international law. Egypt was a partner in the condominium that ruled Sudan and East African governments were unenthusiastic about the idea of the southern Sudanese provinces joining them.
In 1946, with Egypt attempting to reassert its sovereignty over the whole of Sudan, and with northern nationalist groups articulating demands for self-governance and self-determination within Sudan’s geographical boundaries, a separate administrative future for the southern Sudan was no longer even a theoretical possibility, and the Sudan government prepared a new policy linking the future of the ‘South’ inextricably with that of the ‘North’.[1]
But some consultation with the educated leadership of the south, that is; junior administrative officials, teachers and chiefs, was deemed necessary, if only for appearance’s sake. Following a preliminary survey of southern opinion, a conference was convened in Juba in June 1947.[2] The conference was exploratory and could take no decisions by itself. Its main purpose was to find out if the nascent leadership of the southern, educated class was willing and able to take part as appointed members in the Legislative Assembly that was being established in Khartoum.[3]
Prior to 1947, no political contact occurred between the South and the North. In June of that year the British colonial civil secretary, Sir James Robertson, called the Juba Conference to inform the South Sudanese representatives (who were selected by the British, not by the South Sudanese themselves) that he had decided that South Sudan would now become part of Northern Sudan.[4] Indeed, Robertson came to Juba accompanied by well-educated, sweet-talking Northern Sudanese intellectuals selected by the British for the purpose of reassuring the uneducated tribal chiefs of South Sudan that they would be in the very safe hands of their Northern Sudanese ‘brothers’.[5]
Nevertheless, the South Sudanese chiefs who attended the 1947 Juba Conference did not miss the point. Chief Lolik of the Nyanguara tribe of Eastern Equatoria, one of the most vocal of the chiefs attending the conference, observed that it was clear to the attendees that the British had decided to hand them over to new masters – the Northern Sudanese Arabs.[6] Southerners at the Juba Conference were unanimous in their rejection of the British move on the first day of the conference.[7]
The 1947 Juba Conference was significant to the future of the Sudan as a country, as well as the post-independence relationship between north and south. The significance of the conference was as follows:
The Conference affirmed the combination of north and south into one country (Sudan) which was to be granted self-rule. This, despite protestations from the southerners who had envisioned their region joining their Nilotic brothers in British East Africa, based on the earlier proposals that had been tabled by the British. The conference effectively ended the aspirations and hopes of the southerners of being ridden from the exploitation of the north by ruling out the possibility of becoming part of East Africa.
The Conference in not so many words, echoed the sentiment of the southerners about the true intention of forcing the south and north to become one country despite the fact that they had been governed as two different territorial entities by the British. The Conference clearly stipulated that the south needed to join the north in order to create a viable nation that could advance into self-rule and self-determination.[8]
The Conference also echoed the acknowledgement by the British that they had indeed marginalized the southerners in terms of education, political development and economics. This was through the admission that the south did not have enough educated and politically empowered members within its ranks, and that they needed to become part of the north in order to viably survive in the post-colonial setting.
The Conference exposed the fact that colonial/imperialistic interests were still at play even in the face of deciding the future of the southerners. Despite the glaring signs that the north and south would not be suited for a one nation state, the British still considered maintaining their relationship with Egypt as more important and therefore could not dare go against the Egyptians by joining the southerners to British East Africa as had been the promise. Since the south was technically still an Egyptian colony, the British had to maintain the status quo by ensuring that the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan remained intact.[9]
The Conference also documented the inferiority position of the south as compared to the north, as had been perpetrated by the British. This, since it was acknowledged that the southerners were not civilized enough to govern themselves. Out of the 800 people selected to replace departing British colonial administrators, only 4 were southerners, further undercutting the rhetoric of fair engagement and representation in the combined state.[10]
The Conference further illustrated the fact that the southerners would continue to be dominated and marginalized by northerners just as they had been under the British. Despite the numerous protestations about bringing them together with the northerners, the decision had already been made and their input was just a formality would not change anything. The Conference effectively signaled to the southerners that if they were to truly acquire fair treatment, they had to take matters into their own hands and fight for it.
Overall, the Juba Conference of 1947 was instrumental to the future of the Sudan as a whole and the south-north relationship in particular. It brought an unwilling south together with the north, mostly for the convenience of the north, and in the process signaled that southerners were to continue being treated as second class citizens in the post-independence Sudan. Its therefore fair to assert that the 1947 Juba Conference was a precursor to the north-south conflicts as documented in the first and second Sudan civil wars, and consequently the secession of the south into an independent nation.
[1] Mazrui, A.A., (1973). Arabs in Comparative Perspective, In Dunstan M. Wai (ed.), The Southern Sudan and the problem of national integration. London: Frank Cass.
[2] Malwal, B. (2015). South Sudan: The Beginning of the Struggle for Political Emancipation, 1947–2004. In: Sudan and South Sudan. St Antony’s Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London.
[3] Robertson, J.W. (1974). Transition in Africa: From direct rule to independence (London: C. Hurst), p. 107
[4] SANU. (1965). Memorandum on the future of the Southern Sudan’, 16 March, 1965, published in Round-Table Conference on the Southern Sudan, Khartoum March 16-25, 1965 (‘Sudan Informazioni’ News Agency Documents), pp. 148-53.
[5] Mazrui, A.A., (1973). Arabs in Comparative Perspective, In Dunstan M. Wai (ed.), The Southern Sudan and the problem of national integration. London: Frank Cass.
[6] Wai, D.M. (ed.), (1973). The Southern Sudan and the problem of national integration. London: Frank Cass.
[7] Collins, C. (1976). Colonialism and Class Struggle in Sudan. MERIP Reports, 46(1), 3-20
[8] SANU. (1965). Memorandum on the future of the Southern Sudan’, 16 March, 1965, published in Round-Table Conference on the Southern Sudan, Khartoum March 16-25, 1965 (‘Sudan Informazioni’ News Agency Documents), pp. 148-53.
[9] Alford, H.S.L, & W. Dennistoun S. (1999). The Egyptian Soudan: Its Loss and Recovery. London: Macmillan, London.
[10] Robertson, J.W. (1974). Transition in Africa: From direct rule to independence (London: C. Hurst), p. 107