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Identify and explain the shortcomings of the 12 man committee in Sudan

The twelve-man committee was a panel of distinguished members of the northern and southern Sudan, established with the mandate to lay out ways through which the resolutions of the Round Table Conference would be implemented.[1] It comprised of 6 political leaders from the south and 6 from the north.[2] The Round Table Conference of 1964 was called to settle the outstanding issues of the south following the October revolution that overthrew the repressive military regime of General Abboud (who had side-lined the provisions of the 1956 Transitional Constitution regarding the south). The new civilian administration showed willingness to deal with the issue of the south.[3]

At the end of the Round Table Conference it was declared that the delegates had not come to agreement on any suitable constitutional and administrative system for the country, especially concerning the south, and that this task was referred to a Twelve-Man Committee, which was to end its work within three months.[4] The terms of reference of the Twelve-man committee were as follows: to dwell on the issue of the constitutional and administrative set-up which would protect the special interests of the South as well as the general interests of the Sudan; to act as a watch committee on the implementation of the steps and policies agreed upon; and to plan the normalization of conditions in the South and consider steps for the lifting of the state of emergency and the establishment of law and order.[5] The findings of the committee were to be presented to the conference which would be called by the government within three months.

The Twelve-man committee, which at first comprised the six Northern political parties that participated in the Conference and the two Southern parties, commenced its business on May 27th 1965, and tendered its final report on June 26th 1966. It held a total of 48 meetings and heard expert witnesses on some subjects.[6] Stretched over a year, the committee’s Final Report remains an important document in the history of Southern Sudan. The Twelve-man committee appears to have encountered no serious difficulties under the government of Sirr El-Khatim El-Khalifa.[7] The Prime Minister, who was interested in the work of the Committee, gave it his full co-operation and concern. However, during the sittings of the committee, problems started coming up that posed serious a challenge for the committee.[8]

The first problem arose from the security concerns brought about by the continued killings in the south despite a declaration of the ceasefire, which had been ignored by the Anyanya. A resolution by the northern committee members to condemn the violence of the Anyanya ‘outlaws’ was rejected by southern members who insisted that any condemnation had to include the Sudan Army because it was party to the violence.[9] This was rejected by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Hassan El-Turabi (a northern member) who insisted that condemning the army would embolden the Anyanya and lead to more violence.[10] This disagreement resulted into the resignation of some northern members on the committee, including members of the Communist Party and People’s Democratic Party. This hindered the progress of the Twelve-man committee in its task.[11]

But the greatest shortcoming or obstacle to the committee came with the resignation of the Care-taker Government and the emergence of a new government headed by Sayed Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub.[12] This government with its policies of war in the South was hostile to anything having to do with peace in the South. All the work done by the previous government to restore peace and stability in the South was dismantled and the Twelve-man committee was itself in danger of being fragmented.[13]

On 22nd July 1965, the Committee invited the Prime Minister, Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub, to report on the implementation of the Round Table Conference Resolutions, and the state of security in the South. His statements were direct and straightforward. Concerning his government’s policy in the South, he said: I have given instructions to the Army to use force and disarm the mutineers. The Army cannot just keep stationary at a time when some of the Southern leaders have issued their instructions to the mutineers to hold on to their arms for the coming five years.[14]

As for the implementation of the Round Table Conference Resolutions, he said that Southern officials had been transferred to the South and that these officials regretfully “began to instigate policemen and prison warders against the government and to assist the mutineers and law breakers.”[15] Asked whether steps had been taken for training the Southerners as a practical step towards ‘Southernization’, he replied: “Can I say to people, ‘come and apply for the jobs that suit you?, It is the responsibility of Southerners to submit their applications and they will be taken if they pass both the examination and the interview.”[16]

The Prime Minister’s outline of his government policy left no slightest doubt in the minds of the committee members that the task of normalizing the conditions of security in the South was no longer possible.[17] The committee, therefore, abandoned the issue of security and implementation of the conference resolutions and then turned to its other terms of reference (i.e. the constitutional and administrative set-up).[18] By abandoning the question of security in the South on its agenda, the committee in effect seemed to suggest that it had approved of the government’s new policy on the south, contrary to the line of approach laid down by the Round Table Conference and on the basis of which this same committee was set up.[19]

Faced with circumstances of neglect by both the government and the press, the activities of the Twelve-man committee dwindled into oblivion and when the committee’s report was finally published, many people, especially in the north, had forgotten what this Twelve-man committee was all about.[20] The report of the Twelve-man committee claimed to have provided a constitutional and administrative structure for the Sudan. It established a regional government system purporting to apply to all the provinces of the Sudan.

It may occasion a surprise to note that the committee, in working out its constitutional and administrative arrangements, did not make any specific references to the South. This should have been so because the committee’s terms of reference were specifically to protect the special interests of the South as well as the general interests of the Sudan.[21] Instead of endeavouring to protect the Southern interests, the committee created another grievance for the South by splitting it into three separate regions, each with its own regional government.[22] Southerners naturally disliked it since they had always regarded Southern Sudan as an integral whole within the Sudan.

Southerners feared that the move to divide the South was another sinister move by the North to weaken the South with a view of suppressing it forever.[23] Therefore, although the Twelve-man committee had, to some extent, succeeded in making an administrative arrangement for the Sudan in general, it failed to find a workable solution to the Southern question in particular.

[1] Lesch, A.M. (1998). The Sudan-Contested National Identities. Indiana University Press. United States of America. P. 42-43

[2] Hasan, Y.F. (2003). Studies in Sudanese History. SUDATeK Limited. Khartoum. P. 181

[3] Warburg, G.R. (1992). Historical Discord in the Nile Valley. Northwestern University Press. Evanston, Illinois. P. 130

[4] An-Na’im, A.A. (1993). Constitutional discourse and the civil war in the Sudan. Chapter 5, pp. 97-116, In Daly, M.W. and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga (eds.) 1993: Civil War in the Sudan. London: British Academic Press.

[5] Lesch, A.M. (1998). The Sudan-Contested National Identities. Indiana University Press. United States of America. P. 45-49

[6] Sørbø, G. & Ghaffar, A.A.M. (eds.) (2013). Sudan Divided. Continuing Conflict in a Contested State. Palgrave Macmillan. New York. P. 3

[7] Warburg, G.R. (1992). Historical Discord in the Nile Valley. Northwestern University Press. Evanston, Illinois. P. 137-39

[8] Warburg, G.R. (2003). Islam, Sectarianism and Politics in Sudan since the Mahdiyya. Hurst & Company. London. P. 1

[9] Warburg, G.R. (2003). Islam, Sectarianism and Politics in Sudan since the Mahdiyya. Hurst & Company. London. P. 4-5

[10] Vambheim, M. (2007). Making Peace While Waging War. Master Thesis, University of Bergen. P. 7 Available at: https://bora.uib.no/handle/1956/2359 [Las accessed 04-05.14]

[11] SANU. (1965). Memorandum on the future of the Southern Sudan’, 16 March, 1965, published in Round-Table Conference on the Southern Sudan, Khartoum March 16-25, 1965 (‘Sudan Informazioni’ News Agency Documents).

[12] Abel, A. (1990). Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements dishonored. Exeter: Ithaca Press.

[13] Collins, R.O. (1999). Africans, Arabs, and Islamists: From the Conference Tables to the Battlefields in the Sudan. African Studies Review, 42(2), 105- 123.

[14] Abel, A. (1990). Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonored. Exeter: Ithaca Press.

[15] Collins, R.O. (1999). Africans, Arabs, and Islamists: From the Conference Tables to the Battlefields in the Sudan. African Studies Review, 42(2), 105- 123.

[16] Abel, A. (1990). Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonored. Exeter: Ithaca Press.

[17] Abel, A. (1990). Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonored. Exeter: Ithaca Press.

[18] Hasan, Y.F. (2003). Studies in Sudanese History. SUDATeK Limited. Khartoum. P. 187-88

[19] Malwal, B. (2015). South Sudan: The Beginning of the Struggle for Political Emancipation, 1947–2004. In: Sudan and South Sudan. St Antony’s Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London.

[20] Collins, R.O. (1999). Africans, Arabs, and Islamists: From the Conference Tables to the Battlefields in the Sudan. African Studies Review, 42(2), 111- 127.

[21] Mazrui, A.A., (1973). Arabs in Comparative Perspective, In Dunstan M. Wai (ed.), The Southern Sudan and the problem of national integration. London: Frank Cass.

[22] Malwal, B. (2015). South Sudan: The Beginning of the Struggle for Political Emancipation, 1947–2004. In: Sudan and South Sudan. St Antony’s Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London.

[23] Sørbø, G. & Ghaffar, A.A.M. (eds.) (2013). Sudan Divided. Continuing Conflict in a Contested State. Palgrave Macmillan. New York. P. 14

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