General Sun Tzu defined strategy as a specific method for choosing the right course of action from among a group of potential tactics. A tactic is the chosen response to a situation, that is, the execution or implementation of the selected response (McNeilly, 1996, p. 126). A particular tactic is chosen depending upon the entire strategy, but the way that response is executed depends on the tactics. His definition was much closer to the definition of strategy used in modern strategic studies, which is a chosen set of methods reacting to possible situations. These sets of methods set chosen with a big-picture view of mission and the competitive environment. Because of this, some might call Sun Tzu’s work a book of tactics (Reichard & Johnson, 2011, p. 35).
Based on Sun Tzu’s views on warfare and his prescriptions on how to achieve organizational outcomes through strategic maneuver on the key elements of an organized action, Sun Tzu’s philosophy is framed in terms of strategic leadership (Chen and Lee, 2008, p. 153). While paying attention to ways of organizing, developing, and motivating a highly effective organization, the importance of factors external to the leader–member relationship is highlighted, including the higher authority, the larger community, and alliances and enemies, and the immanent situational and contextual factors. Sun Tzu introduces the term strategy to suggest a system or institutional perspective.
Sun Tzu’s adherence to the holistic approach to warfare makes his strategic theory fundamentally situational. Of the five determinants of a victory in war, three are external factors (the socio-political environment, the weather, and the terrain) and two are internal to the organization (the quality of the leader and the condition of the army) (Fernandez, 2004, p. 56). In his other opinions about strategy, there are clear themes of using unorthodoxy and surprise, and of varying tactics according to circumstances. Sun Tzu’s situational approach to strategy is also reflected in the importance he places on situational psychological factors relative to individual ones. He argues that ‘one who is skilled in directing war always tries to turn the situation to his advantage rather than make excessive demands on his subordinates’ (Chapter 5, Wu, 2001), which suggests that success depends more on how the resources are strategically and situationally deployed by the leader than on the quality or psychological state of the resources themselves.
Furthermore, Sun Tzu sees team cohesion and morale as largely a function of situation rather than a purely chronic condition. He predicts that people will have greater morale when they are at the beginning of a campaign, when they find themselves deep in challenging times, when they are well concentrated and rested, and when they have no other option or way to back out (Chapter 11, Wu, 2001). He says that a team under such conditions will be vigilant without being pushed or coerced, will carry out their duties without compulsion, will be devoted without constraint, will observe maximum discipline even with minimum or no close surveillance (Chapter 11: 103, Wu, 2001).
Despite and/or because of his situational views of individual psychology and organizational effectiveness, Sun Tzu believes strongly that success lies in the ability of the leader on the one hand to comprehend and appreciate the power of a situation and, on the other, to rise above the situation by creating, leveraging, and adapting to the existing and emergent environment, which is strategic situationalism, according to Chen and Lee (2008, p. 158). This implies that a winning strategy is not one that focuses on coercion or under-handed maneuvering, but rather one that leverages and adapts to the situational challenges and turns into advantages.
The Art of war contains many descriptions of the attributes of ideal strategic leadership. In describing an ideal sovereign the most common terms, Sun Tzu uses are humaneness (benevolence and righteousness) and enlightenedness. In describing an ideal general, Sun Tzu lists five attributes: wisdom, trustworthiness, benevolence, courage, and firmness (Chapter 1: 5, Wu, 2001). While benevolence is the most important virtue of government, wisdom appears to be the most important attribute of strategic leadership. To Sun Tzu, wisdom is a much broader concept than intelligence as it refers to the acquisition of knowledge and skills through accumulation and the ability to fulfill one’s responsibility.
In fact, wisdom may arguably be the overarching attribute for Sun Tzu, as it is capable of incorporating courage, firmness or even benevolence and trustworthiness. In describing the wisdom of a strategic leader, Sun Tzu refers to understanding the broader strategic mission, seeing yin and yang (danger inherent in advantages, but advantage in dangers), having foreknowledge of the enemy and the battleground situation, recognizing emergent changes of the situation, and having the skill to use unorthodox strategies, to leverage situations (e.g. different environments), to deploy resources according to the situation, and to win the loyalty and compliance of subordinates through soft and hard means (Lee et al., 1998, p. 104).
In superior-subordinate relations, Sun Tzu looks at trustworthiness primarily as loyalty to the superior whereas, in contrast, benevolence is directed downward toward the subordinates. Courage may be the ideal attribute that is most special to military organization and combat situations, but to a large extent so is firmness. However, firmness is more universal to all organizations as it counterbalances benevolence, and for Sun Tzu, benevolence without firmness may create loyal following without capacity to be effectively deployed (McNeilly, 1996, p. 128). An ideal leader according to Sun Tzu, needs to have five more desirable traits; ability to build character and not just image, lead with actions and not just words, share in the employee’s trials and not just their triumphs, motivate emotionally and not just materially, assign clearly defined missions to all, avoiding mission overlap and confusion, and a strategy-driven organization and not an organizational-driven strategy.
Sun Tzu also lists five fatal strategic flaws that can bring calamity (Chapter 8, Wu, 2001). ‘Those who are ready to die can be killed; those who are intent on living can be captured; those who are quick to anger can be shamed; those who are puritanical can be disgraced; those who love people can be troubled’ (Cleary, 2000, p. 135). These are vulnerabilities that can be strategically exploited by the enemy in combat situations. Although these have been typically viewed as character or trait flaws, they can also be viewed as cognitive and emotional errors committed in response to extremely turbulent and volatile situations. Regardless of whether they are chronic traits or situationally induced characteristics, they are nevertheless, strategic flaws which must be understood and overcome.
With the exception of the fear of death and a quick temper, three qualities could be viewed as positive attributes of courage, honor, and benevolence if they exist in moderation or are counter-balanced by other attributes. When a strategy is anchored to an otherwise good value or a course of action to the exclusion of other values and options, the otherwise good strategy becomes a flaw. Courage without wisdom and benevolence without firm discipline are examples (Lo, Ho and Sculli, 1998, p. 164). Single-mindedness can be fatal because it breeds the inability to adapt to the complex and changing situation or makes one more vulnerable to strategic maneuvering by more skillful opponents. In pointing out these flaws, Sun Tzu in effect, holds a holistic and situational view of positive strategic characteristics.
Furthermore, because a single-minded overzealous strategy is typically guided by emotion rather than by knowledge of the objective situations and the sound reasoning of strategic thinking, Sun Tzu points to the importance of emotional stability and balance for strategic thinking and strategic operation. He repeatedly warns against launching wars and battles (or taking actions) as a result of the emotion. He warns that whereas emotions can be reversed, lost lives and collapsed states, wasted and destroyed resources can never be regained (Reichard & Johnson, 2011, p. 37).
Key to Sun Tzu’s strategic thinking is the Chinese concept of situation (shi), situation-making (zhao shi), and situational adaptation (yin shi). The Chinese term shi has been loosely translated as force, position, power, or momentum. In the The purpose of strategies and tactics regarding shi is to create a positive position (you shi) relative to an opponent, i.e. relative advantage, and the more overwhelming the advantage, the greater the likelihood of swift and complete victory. In the Art of war strategic situational advantage is further divided into subtypes of advantage: positional (terrain), organizational, and morale/spirit (qi shi) (Tung, 1994, p. 59).
The most potent (positional) advantage according to Sun Tzu lies in placing oneself in an advantageous position vis-a’-vis a competitor in a given competing environment. This involves creating a strategically favorable environment for oneself. In the most basic sense of the term, Sun Tzu refers to the positional advantage of terrain (di shi). ‘When torrential water moves boulders, it is because of its momentum. Logs and rocks remain immobile when they are on level ground but fall forward when on a steep slope (Wu, Chou & Wu, 2004, p. 402). The strategic advantage of troops skillfully commanded in battle may be compared to the momentum of round boulders rolling down from mountain heights.’
Sun Tzu emphasizes that it is far more effective create situations (zhao shi) in which one is advantageously positioned and ready than to demand bravery and heroic reaction when faced with adversity. Strategic acuity must therefore pay more attention to creating favorable situations than accepting and working within situations that are dictated by opposing/competing forces. The former requires strategic thinking, foreknowledge, and proactivity (Wong, Maher & Lee, 1998, p. 86). Sun Tzu prescribes many proactive behaviors for creating a preponderance of positional advantage relative to opponents, ranging through full preparation, arriving early, deploying more resources, and providing better logistics, etc.
However, positional advantage seems to start with or depend on the advantage in knowing, especially in having information, as can be seen in the great importance of “knowing yourself and knowing your enemy.” It is no wonder the book starts with war parameter assessment, which requires information on warring parties and ends with the importance of using secret agents for information advantage. Because Sun Tzu believed in the ability to manipulate the strategic environment to one’s advantage, he places high priority on intelligence about the actual conditions of the battle, and affords it a strategically decisive role (Lord, 2000, p. 304).
One of the five parameters of strategic victory is the organization of resources, by which Sun Tzu refers to the unity of command, the consistent enforcement of rules and regulations, clear rewards and punishments, and the coordination of different parts of the army. Whether presented with vast or limited resources according to Sun Tzu, it all comes down to organization, instituting layers of control, and communication. These ideas are clearly reflected in the Western ideas of scientific management, especially in the essential managerial functions of planning, organizing, commanding, and controlling (Wee, 1994, p. 99).
Sun Tzu proposes constant variations of orthodox and unorthodox formations in deploying troops. The conventional formations are generally used to engage the opponent while the surprise tactics are employed to win victories. Yet, unconventional and deceptive tactics such as feigning confusion, weakness, and retreat or withdrawal rely heavily on the order, strength, and unity that lie in the organizational advantages. There seems to be a paradox in Sun Tzu’s insistence on a rather rigid structure of unity of command and organizational discipline on one hand but flexibility, innovation, and variation of actions on the other. Sun Tzu’s answer to the paradox lies in the leader’s strategic discretion (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987) as well as the leader’s ability to create and leverage situational and psychological advantages (Chapter 8: 69, Wu, 2001).
Sun Tzu believes that although the mandate is set from the top (which is also subject to the criteria of righteousness and benevolence) subordinates should be fully empowered to execute the mandate without interference from the top especially when the higher authority has no full knowledge of the situation in the field. Sun Tzu also believes in following the rationality of acting according to the objective contingent requirement of the war rather than the subjective wishes of the top leadership (Chapter 10: 93, Wu, 2001).
Morale advantage refers to a psychological advantage, the degree of superiority of a troop over its enemy in terms of a conviction of morality and efficacy and a determination to achieve victory. Sun Tzu sees the psychological identification and attachment of the rank and file with the leader and the organization as essential. ‘If troops are punished before their loyalty is secured they will be disobedient. If not obedient, it is difficulty to employ them’ (Chapter 9: 85, Wu, 2001). Benevolence must be coupled with discipline through training and deployment. Leaders should be benevolent but strict with their subordinates, gain their loyalty, and have a harmonious relationship with them (Chapter 9, Wu, 2001).
While situation-making stresses creating favorable positional, organizational, and psychological situations, taking advantage and adapting to existing situations is also part of strategic situationalism, and this is closest to the contingency approach of leadership in the West (Fiedler, 1977; Hersey and Blanchard, 1981). In Chinese, leveraging and adaptation are called yin shi, literally meaning ‘following the situation.’ Change of operations and tactics in response to emergent situations is a major component of strategic thinking. The emergent situations may present opportunities to be leveraged and constraints to be adapted to. Sun Tzu likens the leader’s ability to change to a property of water. He asserts that as water changes its course in accordance with the contours of the terrain, so should leaders change their tactics in accordance to the situation (Chapter 6: 57, Wu, 2001).
The variation and change of tactics are based on understanding all aspects of the situation: the location, the time, the state and condition of one’s environment versus that of the competition. The key is to understand fully the emergent and the potential favorable and unfavorable factors. It is in the context of adaptation and change that Sun Tzu identifies those five fatal flaws of a leader and his strategies (Chapter 9, Wu, 2001). These flaws orient the leader to staying on a wrong course because of adherence to some predetermined doctrine, high authority, or emotion.
Sun Tzu is mostly concerned with the whole organization: its legitimacy, its systems of operation and administration, the collective followership, or the unity and morale of the organizational members. His unit of analysis and his target of strategic actions are more often than not at the collective rather than the individual level. His collectivity also tends to be at the highest collectivity level, that is, the overall organization rather than its individual divisions and subdivisions. Such an approach speaks to the Western literature on strategic leadership (Boal and Hooijberg, 2001; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996) and contributes to it by emphasizing the creation of external and internal winning environments. Leadership in the global context calls not only for cross-cultural relationship-building but also for attention to issues of external and internal environments, system-level adaptation, and collective identification.
Sun Tzu’s situationalism thinking provides interesting critiques on the person-situation debate in the organizational behavior literature and on cross-cultural research on cognition. The person-situation debate centers on whether it is individuals’ stable internal characteristics or the external situation that determine people’s behavior (Ross and Nisbett, 1991). Dispositionalists believe that the impact of individual characteristics is more significant whereas situationalists believe in the power of the situation. Cross-cultural comparative research on cognition and behavior shows that the Chinese are more holistic in that they see more situational causal factors, whereas Westerners are more analytic and agential as they are more likely to see individual actors as causal agents of events (Nisbett et al., 2001, p. 296).
Both these bodies of strategic thought might suggest that Chinese leaders, relative to their Western counterparts, believe more in the power of situation than in that of individuals, so that Chinese leadership is expected to be less assertive or less proactive with regards to situation or environment. This, however, is not what we observe in Sun Tzu’s leadership philosophy as manifested in the Art of war. What we observe is that while Sun Tzu does believe in the causal power of the situation he nevertheless also believes in great leaders being masters of situation-making, situation manipulation, and situation leveraging.
Sun Tzu also points to the concept of wisdom and the importance of information. Whereas the Chinese concept of wisdom or enlightenment bears some resemblance to the concept of intelligence in Western psychology (Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991, p. 56), there may be important differences. First, the Western concept of intelligence is a personality trait that is largely hereditary and non-malleable whereas the Chinese concept of wisdom is acquired through continuous study and practice. The Chinese concept of wisdom is also broader than managerial wisdom as conceived by Boal & Hooijberg (2001, p. 522) or job-related knowledge (Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991). Most likely the Chinese concept of wisdom is multidimensional and, in Sun Tzu’s conceptions, it could be a meta-characteristic of what leadership is about.
Another point relating to wisdom is about strategic information-seeking. Lord (2000, p. 304) credited Sun Tzu for anticipating the information-oriented strategic approach of the contemporary revolution in military, business and management affairs. It can be further argued that if information-seeking becomes the norm, information quality in terms of completeness, relevance, and accuracy and information management may be important factors that affect the effectiveness of strategic situationalism.
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